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Abstract
A brief  mindfulness  intervention  diminished  bias  in  favor  of  one’s
in-group and against one’s out-group. In the linguistic intergroup bias
(LIB), individuals expect in-group members to behave positively and
out-group members to behave negatively.  Consequently,  individuals
choose abstract language beset with character inferences to describe
these expected behaviors, and in contrast, choose concrete, objective
language to describe unexpected behaviors.  Eighty-four participants
received either mindful attention instructions (observe their thoughts
as fleeting mental states) or immersion instructions (become absorbed
in  the  vivid  details  of  thoughts).  After  instruction,  participants
viewed  visual  depictions  of  an  imagined  in-group  or  out-group
member’s positive or negative behavior, selecting the best linguistic
description from a set of four descriptions that varied in abstractness.
Immersion  groups  demonstrated  a  robust  LIB.  Mindful  attention
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groups, however, exhibited a markedly tempered LIB, suggesting that
even a brief mindfulness related instruction can implicitly reduce the
propensity  to  perpetuate  stereotypical  thinking  through  language.
These  results  contribute  to  understanding  the  mechanisms  that
facilitate unprejudiced thinking.
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Introduction
Language offers a window to the mind. Among other things, we use
language to maintain and communicate expectancies, including our
privately held beliefs about people and events (Douglas et al. 2008 ).
Regardless of our intentions, the language we use may implicitly or
explicitly transmit bias in the form of stereotypes and prejudice (Maass
1999 ; Wigboldus et al. 2000 , 2005 ). One way to measure these kinds
of bias is by using a property of language known as linguistic
abstraction, specifically, the amount of interpretive information
conveyed when describing a person or behavior (Semin and Fiedler
1988 , 1991 , 1992 ).
Linguistic abstraction can be used to characterize how people select
verbs and adjectives to describe a person or a behavioral event at
different levels of description, ranging from concrete to abstract. The
Linguistic Category Model, for example, identifies four levels of
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linguistic abstraction (“LCM,” Semin and Fiedler 1988 , 1991 , 1992 ).
Figure 1  illustrates the LCM with examples of cartoon images for (1) a
negatively valenced behavior (hitting another person) and (2) a positive
behavior (picking up someone who fell). The main character in the
cartoon is labeled with the letter “A.” The four levels of the LCM in
Fig. 1  exhibit increasing amounts of interpretation about a depicted
event. At Level 1, descriptive action verbs are the most concrete,
providing a non-interpretive description of an event or behavior (e.g., A
is hitting the other person). At Level 2, interpretive action verbs also
describe a specific event or behavior, but include some interpretation,
making them more abstract than Level 1 (e.g., A is hurting the other
person). At Level 3, state verbs are more abstract than the previous two
levels because they describe an emotional state of the person involved
rather than a specific detail of the event or behavior (e.g., A hates the
other person). At Level 4, adjectives are the most abstract, describing
the characteristics of the person performing the behavior, not the
behavior itself (e.g., A is violent). The choice to describe an action
concretely vs. abstractly is really a choice about whether to describe the
action in terms of someone’s current physical behavior vs. their
long-term abstract nature. The contexts in which people choose to make
a “character judgment,” or decide not to, can reveal stereotyped beliefs
about social groups.
Fig. 1
Cartoon 1 is an example of a negative behavior performed by the main
character  labeled “A,”  with  four  possible  linguistic  descriptions  of  the
behavior listed below. These four descriptions are in order of increasing
abstractness, corresponding to the levels of abstraction in the Linguistic
Category Model (LCM). Cartoon 2 is an example of a positive behavior
performed by character A, with its corresponding linguistic descriptions.
Like the negative behavior cartoon, these descriptions also correspond to
the levels of linguistic abstraction in the LCM. Cartoons reproduced with
the permission of. Dr. Anne Maass
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Two processes—differential expectancies and in-group protection—play
important roles in determining the level of linguistic abstraction used to
describe an observed action. These two processes also play central roles
in conveying stereotypes and intergroup bias. Each process is addressed
in turn.
First, consider differential expectancies. In general, people tend to use
abstract, interpretive language when describing a behavior that matches
their expectations (Maass 1999 ; Maass et al. 1995 95; Wigboldus et al.
2000 ). If one holds a stereotyped expectation that men are aggressive,
for example, one would be likely to choose the most abstract
description of Cartoon 1 in Fig. 1  (A is aggressive). This abstract
language implies that the behavior is believed to be typical of the
individual or group and is related to their “makeup” (Maass 1999 ;
Maass et al. 1995 ).
In contrast, people tend to use more concrete, non-interpretive language
when describing a behavior that violates their expectations (Maass
1999 ; Maass et al. 1995 ; Wigboldus et al. 2000 ). When a high-level
explanation of the behavior is lacking, people simply describe the
behavior. Returning to our previous example, if one holds a stereotyped
belief that women are not aggressive and views a woman (instead of a
man) hitting a person in Cartoon 1, one would be more likely to choose
the most concrete description (A is hitting the other person). Concrete
language implies that the behavior is believed to be uncharacteristic of
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the individual or group. Such language refrains from relating the
behavior to someone’s nature, and prevents contradicting the
stereotyped belief, for example, that women are not aggressive (Maass
1999 ; Maass et al. 1995 ).
Thus, the level of linguistic abstraction in each of these two examples
serves to maintain one’s stereotyped beliefs about men being aggressive
and women not being aggressive (Maass 1999 ; Maass et al. 1995 ).
This phenomenon is called the Linguistic Expectancy Bias or the LEB
(Maass et al. 1995 ; Wigboldus et al. 2000 ). Notably, stereotyped
expectations that cause the LEB can be negatively valenced (e.g., all
blond women are unintelligent) or positively valenced (e.g., all Asians
are good at math). Regardless of the valence, abstract language is
associated with conveying stereotypical expectations, according to the
LEB.
Further, consider the second process of in-group protection. When one’s
in-group becomes associated with something negative, in-group
protection serves to maintain a positive in-group image (Maass et al.
1989 ). Generally speaking, in-group protection limits the process of
differential expectancies to positive expectancies for in-group members
(and oneself) vs. negative expectancies for out-group members. More
specifically, people tend to use more abstract, interpretive language
when describing a positive behavior performed by a member of their
in-group (e.g., a friend) or when describing a negative behavior
performed by a member of their out-group (e.g., an enemy). If, for
example, character A in Cartoon 2 is their friend, people would be
likely to choose description 4, A is a considerate person. Analogously,
if character A in Cartoon 1 is their enemy, people would be likely to
choose description 4, A is aggressive.
Conversely, people tend to use more concrete, descriptive language
when describing a negative behavior performed by a member of their
in-group or when describing a positive behavior performed by a
member of their out-group. If for example, character A in Cartoon 2 is
their enemy, people would be likely to choose description 1, A is
picking up the other person. Analogously, if character A in Cartoon 1 is
e.Proofing http://eproofing.springer.com/journals/printpage.php?token=c...
5 of 35 12/10/2015 14:43
their friend, people would be likely to choose description 1, A is hitting
the other person.
As we have seen, abstract language relates an observed behavior to
beliefs about the agent’s character, whereas concrete language implies
that an observed action is an exception to typical behavior, inconsistent
with the nature of the individual performing it (e.g., Arcuri et al. 1993 ;
Cole and Leets 1998 ; Maass 1999 ). As a consequence, using levels of
linguistic abstraction in this manner with in-groups and out-groups
serves to maintain a positive in-group bias and a negative out-group
bias (Arcuri et al. 1993 ; Cole and Leets 1998 ; Maass et al. 1989 ). The
use of linguistic abstraction to convey in-group vs. out-group biases
constitutes the Linguistic Intergroup Bias or the LIB (Maass et al.
1989 ). The LIB is a specific form of the more general LEB. Whereas
the LIB is limited to positive vs. negative expectancies for in-groups vs.
out-groups, respectively, the LEB includes a wide variety of additional
expectancies.
People are often not aware that the LIB transmits their underlying
cognitive biases and beliefs to others (Franco & Maass, 1996; Schnake
and Ruscher 1998 ; von Hippel et al. 1997 ). Consequently, it is difficult
to inhibit its effect on linguistic tasks (Franco and & Maass 1999 ). For
these reasons, the LIB can be used as an implicit indicator of people’s
prejudices (von Hippel et al. 1997 ). Although there is some evidence
that this prejudice can be reduced through explicit means (e.g., telling
people to view their out-group in a favorable way; Douglas and Sutton
2003 ; 2008 ), this reduction may simply reflect explicit effects of social
desirability, not a true reduction in bias. Ideally, it would be more
desirable if the LIB could be reduced implicitly, without directly asking
participants about their attitudes toward in- and out-group members
explicitly, thereby minimizing the influence of social desirability.
AQ2
Mindfulness offers a potential implicit modulator of the LIB. Broadly
speaking, mindfulness is present-centered, nonjudgmental awareness
(Kabat-Zinn 1990 , 2003 ). It facilitates sustained attention to ongoing
sensory, cognitive, and emotional experience, while diminishing the
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tendency to react, elaborate, or evaluate (Bishop et al. 2004 ). Over the
past few decades, mindfulness has been associated with numerous
benefits, including increased self-control, affect tolerance, emotional
intelligence, improved concentration, and mental clarity, and the ability
to relate to others and oneself with kindness, acceptance, and
compassion (AdeleHayes & Feldman, 2004; Baer and Lykins 2011 ;
Bishop et al. 2004 ; Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Fulton, 2005;
Leary & Tate, 2007; Wallace, 2001; Walsh & Shapiro, 2006).
AQ3
AQ4
AQ5
AQ6
AQ7
AQ8
Accumulating evidence suggests that mindfulness reduces stereotypical
and prejudicial cognition. Compared to control groups, participants in a
wide variety of mindfulness intervention groups were less likely to
discriminate against handicapped individuals (Langer et al. 1985 ), less
likely to report that prejudicial thoughts were objective facts, and more
likely to endorse the intention to actively reduce bias in their lives
(Lillis and Hayes 2007 ). Further, evidence suggests that mindfulness
can reduce stereotype threat (i.e., when a negative stereotype associated
with one’s in-group becomes active and decreases task performance). In
Weger et al. ( 2012 ), for example, women primed with the stereotype
that “men are better at math” did better on a subsequent math test if
they had previously completed a brief mindfulness intervention
compared to those who had not. Those without the mindfulness
intervention exhibited the typical stereotype threat reduction in math
performance. Similarly, Lueke and Gibson (2015) found that a
mindfulness intervention reduced automatic negative reactions to
out-group members based on race and age as measured by the Implicit
Association Test. Finally, Ostafin et al. (personal communication, 25th
March, 2014) found that individuals high in trait mindfulness were
better at controlling alcohol drinking behaviors, with this relationship
being partially mediated by how abstractly these behaviors were
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represented. Individuals high in mindfulness tended not to link alcohol
behavior to abstract, higher-order goals like emotion regulation. None
of this research, however, has examined whether mindfulness modulates
the LIB.
AQ9
Using a brief mindfulness-based intervention, we aimed to reduce the
expectancy biases that arise during linguistic abstraction. In an
in-group/out-group paradigm that has consistently produced the LIB
(e.g., Maass et al. 1995 ; Douglas and Sutton 2003 ), participants
imagined either their “best friend” (in-group) or “worst enemy”
(out-group) behaving in expected ways or unexpected ways (as depicted
by cartoons like those in Fig. 1 ) before selecting the linguistic
description that best described the action. In the immersion groups that
attempted to replicate the LIB, participants immersed themselves in
their thoughts and emotional reactions to the cartoons (the default
approach to engaging with them). Conversely, in the mindful attention
groups, participants simply observed their thoughts and reactions to
cartoons, viewing them as transient mental events. As a result of
shifting perspective from the default state of immersion to mindfully
observing one’s thoughts, we predicted that participants would
disengage from the situations depicted in the pictured scenes, such that
their stereotypical reactions to them would not appear as subjectively
real as usual. As a further consequence, participants should refrain from
ascribing abstract, interpretive, character judgments to their friends
when they acted positively, and from ascribing character judgments to
their enemies when they acted negatively. Once participants no longer
engaged in elaborative, inference-filled thought, they should choose
relatively concrete behavioral descriptions, regardless of whether their
in-group or out-group member acted in line with their expectations.
Thus, we predicted that mindful attention would attenuate, and perhaps
eliminate, the LIB effect that normally occurs while being immersed in
viewing scenes. Specifically, we predicted that this modulation of the
LIB would reveal itself in a three-way interaction between perspective
(mindful attention/immersion), character (friend/enemy), and cartoon
behavior valence (positive/negative).
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Method
Participants
Eighty-four (21 per group) students (60 female) from Emory University
participated for course credit, ranging in age from 18 to 26 (M  =  19).
The sample was 59 % Caucasian, 21 % Asian, 11 % Hispanic, 7 %
African American, and 2 % identified as other. Of the 84 participants,
25 stated that they had previous meditation experience (6 in
immersion/friend, 4 in immersion/enemy, 7 in mindful attention/friend,
and 8 in mindful attention/enemy). These meditation experiences ranged
from periodic yoga classes to daily prayers and breathing exercises. We
obtained informed consent from each participant and treated them in
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki and its later amendments. The Emory Institutional Review
Board approved this protocol.
Procedure
The experiment took place on a laptop using E-prime software inside
individual cubicles in either a laboratory or library setting. The mixed
design consisted of a repeated measures factor of behavior valence
(positive/negative), with two between-group manipulations, character
(friend/enemy), and perspective (mindful attention/immersion), yielding
four groups: (1) mindful attention/friend, (2) mindful attention/enemy,
(3) immersion/friend, and (4) immersion/enemy. After being randomly
assigned to a condition, each participant viewed all the same cartoon
stimuli, presented in a random order during both the practice and testing
phases. Participants were not aware that the experiment included a
mindfulness-based intervention, but instead were told that the
experiment examined how we view our peers. Instructions were
provided visually on the laptop, with the experimenter answering
questions as needed.
In-Group/Out-Group Manipulation
Participants were first asked to imagine that the person labeled with the
letter A in the cartoons to come was either their friend or enemy,
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depending on their group assignment. They viewed four practice
cartoons and rated whether they felt negative, neutral, or positive
emotions while viewing them. This initial task encouraged participants
to attend to their thoughts and reactions about the cartoons.
Immersion Instructions
After viewing the practice cartoons and rating their emotions, the
participants in the “immersion perspective” groups were asked to
completely immerse themselves in the cartoon events depicting their
friend (or enemy). They were instructed to “live” the experience by
projecting themselves into the events and by attempting to experience
vivid details such as colors, sounds, smells, as well as emotions,
physical sensations, and bodily states. These participants were
encouraged to experience the events almost as if they were actually
occurring in the present moment (see SM Appendix A  for more
details). The immersion instructions were adapted from Papies et al.
( 2012 ) and Wilson-Mendenhall et al. ( 2011 ).
Mindful Attention Instructions
Participants in the mindful attention groups were asked to view and
think about the cartoon events depicting their friend (or enemy) using
an “observing perspective.” To prevent potential demand, the words
“mindfulness” or “mindful attention” were never used to describe this
perspective. Participants were simply instructed to observe specific
thoughts and reactions that they had in response to viewing the
cartoons. Rather than engaging in vivid, elaborative thought about the
event, they were asked to treat their thoughts and reactions as transitory,
fleeting mental states. They were further instructed that these thoughts
and reactions are not really part of the cartoon events but are what the
mind constructs at that moment. Thus, when the participants practiced
this “observing perspective,” they remained aware that they were
simply observing their thoughts and reactions to the events in the
present moment instead of “living” them (see SM Appendix A  for more
details). The mindful attention instructions were adapted from Papies et
al. 2012  (also see Lebois et al. 2015 ; Papies et al 2015 ). The mindful
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attention and immersion instructions were presented in a similar style
and length.
After the perspective instruction, the experimenter verified that the
participants understood their instructed strategy and asked them to rate
how well they understood it on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very well).
Next, participants viewed the four practice cartoons again, to practice
immersing or observing. For each cartoon, participants had 10 s to
perform immersion or observation while they viewed their friend (or
enemy) in the respective event before the screen advanced to the next
practice cartoon. This procedure repeated for all four practice cartoons.
After this second phase of practice was completed, participants rated
how well overall they were able to perform immersion or observation.
Once this instruction was complete, participants advanced to the critical
task.
Multiple-Choice Task
This task was introduced as a new and different part of the experiment.
Depending on their group assignment, participants were instructed to
continue immersing themselves in each cartoon or to continue
observing their reactions to it. At the top of the screen for each trial
(both practice and critical), participants were reminded to either
“Immerse Yourself” or “Observe Your Thoughts” and to also imagine
that the character performing the behavior in the cartoons was either
their “Friend” or “Enemy.” After 10 s of immersion or observation with
respect to the depicted event, four descriptions appeared beneath the
cartoon, and participants selected the description (1, 2, 3, or 4) that they
felt best represented what was occurring in the cartoon. The
descriptions varied in abstractness based on levels of the Linguistic
Category Model described earlier, ranging from (1) very concrete to (4)
very abstract (with nothing being said to participants about the
abstractness of the descriptions). Participants had an unlimited amount
of time to select the description that they felt was best suited for
describing what the main character was doing in the event (typically
taking about 7 to 11 s). After participants made their selection, a 2- s
pause occurred before the computer screen advanced to the next
e.Proofing http://eproofing.springer.com/journals/printpage.php?token=c...
11 of 35 12/10/2015 14:43
cartoon. Half of the cartoons depicted positive behaviors, and half
depicted negative behaviors, all being randomly intermixed (with
nothing being said to participants about the valence manipulation).
Before the critical trials, participants completed four practice trials with
the same practice cartoons that they had already seen twice previously,
this time selecting a description. The experimenter answered any
questions before the participants moved on to the eight critical trials
with the eight novel cartoons. The aforementioned procedure continued
until participants had performed all eight critical trials. After
completing the experiment, participants were asked to describe what
they were doing while viewing the cartoons and to rate how difficult it
was to immerse themselves in the scenes or observe their thoughts to
them on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very difficult). After this rating,
they were asked to describe any personal meditation experience.
Finally, they were debriefed and received compensation for
participating.
Measures
Participants viewed four practice cartoons and eight critical cartoons
(see Fig. 1  for examples). Appendix B  in the Supplementary Materials
(SM) provides all practice and critical cartoon stimuli. Each cartoon
contained one frame depicting an event. Half of the critical cartoon
events depicted positive behaviors that included walking an elderly
person across the road, recycling trash, picking another person up off
the ground, and running. The other half depicted negative behaviors that
included telling a sexist joke, throwing trash on the ground, spray-
painting a wall, and hitting another person. Each cartoon had a main
character clearly labeled with the letter “A.” The main characters were
drawn in a stylized way such that gender and age were less central
features.
Each cartoon was paired with four unique descriptions of increasing
abstractness that portrayed the main character, A’s, actions. Two
examples of these descriptions are provided in Fig. 1 , and all
description options are provided in SM Appendix B . The participants
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were not told that the four descriptions for each cartoon represented
different levels of linguistic abstraction from the Linguistic Category
Model (Semin, 1994; Semin & Fiedler, 19988). For every cartoon, the
four description options for each cartoon always began with the most
concrete first and the most abstract last.
AQ10
AQ11
The eight critical cartoons, one practice cartoon, and their associated
descriptions were the same as those constructed by Douglas and Sutton
( 2003 ). Three additional practice cartoons and associated descriptions
were newly created for this experiment. These additional practice
materials were added to ensure that participants viewed an equal
distribution of positive and negative behavior cartoon events and that
each cartoon event depicted a different behavior. All four experimental
groups used the same practice and critical materials. In addition, all
critical materials were normed in previous studies to ensure that people
perceived the desirable behaviors as positive and the undesirable
behaviors as negative (Douglas and& Sutton 2003 ; Maass et al. 1995 ).
On each trial, the cartoon description chosen was recorded, as was the
response time (RT) for making the choice. Appendix C  presents the
internal consistencies for materials within each condition.
Data Analysis
Participants’ responses on the critical multiple-choice task were
transcribed into numbers based on the Linguistic Category Model, with
1 representing most concrete and 4 representing most abstract. These
linguistic abstraction scores were then entered into various analyses.
Each participant’s responses to positive behaviors were averaged to
create an overall positive behavior abstraction score, and the same was
done for responses to negative behaviors, creating two data points for
each participant. To assess our hypotheses, we performed a priori
contrasts and an analysis of variance (ANOVA) across the four
experimental groups with one repeated factor of behavior valence.
Gender, ethnicity, and age did not predict differences in our results and
therefore have not been controlled for in the following analyses. All
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contrasts were one-tailed tests given that they tested directional
hypotheses. All effect sizes are reported using Hedges’ g  calculated
following Lakens (2013). Figure 2  illustrates both the descriptive
statistics for the cartoon description abstraction responses and the key
inferential statistics that follow (IMM  =  immersion, MA  =  mindful
attention).
Fig. 2
Average  linguistic  abstraction  scores  for  the  four  groups  (immersion-
friend, immersion-enemy, mindful friend, mindful enemy) for each type
of scene (positive, negative). Solid significance bars illustrate differences
between  groups  representing  the  Linguistic  Intergroup  Bias  (LIB).
Dashed significance bars illustrate significant reductions in the LIB. *p  <  
0.05. Standard error bars are ± one standard error of the mean
AQ12
Results
Our key hypotheses involved the three-way interaction between
perspective (mindful attention/immersion), character (friend/enemy),
and behavior valence (positive/negative). We hypothesized that the
immersion groups would robustly replicate the LIB and that the mindful
attention groups would show diminished bias. Consistent with these
predictions, the omnibus three-way interaction was significant, F(1,80)  
s
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=  10.09, p  =  0.002, ηp   =  0.11.
To examine where the predicted group differences occurred within the
three-way interaction, we conducted a series of a priori contrasts further
testing our hypotheses. The significance bars in Fig. 2  illustrate the
results described next. In line with our hypotheses and previous work,
the immersion groups exhibited the LIB. Behaviors that matched their
expectations (friend positive, enemy negative) were rated more
abstractly than unexpected behaviors (friend negative, enemy positive).
The mean difference in the linguistic abstraction scores between friend
(2.57) and enemy (1.40) for a positive behavior was 1.17, t(40)  =  7.31,
SE  =  0.16, p  <  0.001, g   =  2.15. Conversely, the mean difference in the
scores between friend (2.00) and enemy (2.43) for a negative behavior
was −0.43, t(40)  =  −2.05, SE  =  0.21, p  =  0.024, g   =  0.57. As described
earlier, higher numbers indicate more abstraction. Thus, the difference
of 1.17 for positive behaviors indicates that the linguistic abstraction
scores for the friend group were more abstract than were the scores for
the enemy group. In contrast, the difference of −0.43 for negative
behaviors indicates that the linguistic abstraction scores for the friend
group were less abstract than were the scores for the enemy group.
Thus, overall, participants described behaviors that matched their
expectations relatively abstractly (friend positive, enemy negative) and
those that violated their expectations relatively concretely (enemy
positive, friend negative).
Although the mindful attention groups also exhibited the LIB, it was
significantly attenuated as predicted. Four results support this
conclusion. First, the mindful attention groups only exhibited the LIB
for positive behaviors (positive behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M
difference  =  0.37, t(40)  =  2.31, SE  =  0.16, p  =  0.010, g   =  0.79; negative
behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M difference  =  −0.13, t(40)  =  −0.62, SE  =  
0.21, p  >  0.250, g   =  0.20). Mindful attention participants were more
likely to ascribe character judgments to their friends when they were
behaving positively than they were to ascribe these abstract descriptions
to their enemies’ positive actions. These participants did not, however,
ascribe more abstract character judgments to their enemies when they
2
s
s
s
s
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were behaving negatively compared to when their friends behaved
negatively.
Second, the LIB exhibited for positive behaviors in the mindful
attention groups was much smaller than the LIB exhibited for positive
behaviors in the immersion groups; IMM, M difference  =  1.17 vs. MA,
M difference  =  0.37; t(82)  =  3.53, SE  =  0.23, p  <  0.005. This finding
indicates that mindful attention significantly reduced the LIB. Although
mindful attention participants still ascribed character judgments to their
friends when they behaved positively, they did so to a much lesser
extent in comparison to the immersion groups.
Third, the LIB exhibited for positive behaviors in the mindful attention
groups also had a much smaller effect size compared to the immersion
groups (IMM, g   =  2.15 vs. MA, g   =  0.79). Although the effect size for
the LIB in the mindful attention groups was still high, suggesting that
the LIB is difficult to overcome, it was much smaller than in the
immersion groups. Again, mindful attention reduced the LIB.
Fourth, as the dashed significance bars further illustrate in Fig. 2 , the
bias exhibited by the mindful attention groups, relative to the
immersion groups, was attenuated substantially. As hypothesized, this
attenuation occurred for expected behaviors (friend positive, enemy
negative). Specifically, positive behaviors for friends and negative
behaviors for enemies were rated more concretely in the mindful
attention groups than in the immersion groups (Positive friend
behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M difference  =  0.63, t(40)  =  3.94, SE  =  0.16, p  
<  0.001, g   =  1.01; Negative enemy behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M
difference  =  0.54, t(40)  =  2.57, SE  =  0.21, p  =  0.007, g   =  0.76). This
pattern indicates that biased knowledge played less of a role in the
construal of perceived behavior during mindful attention than during
immersion.
We did not have any hypotheses about mindful attention’s influence on
ratings for unexpected behaviors (friend negative, enemy positive).
When we compared immersion and mindful attention groups on these
behaviors, however, there were no significant differences. Consistent
s s
s
s
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with the LIB, behaviors that violated expectations were rated concretely
in both the immersion and mindful attention groups (negative friend
behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M difference  =  0.24, t(40)  =  1.14, SE  =  0.21, p  
=  0.135, g   =  0.34; positive enemy behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M
difference  =  −0.17, t(40)  =  −1.06, SE  =  0.16, p  =  0.142, g   =  0.47). This
pattern is not surprising because unexpected behaviors were already
described more concretely in the immersion groups and because
mindful attention tended to elicit concrete descriptions overall (as
described next).
We were also interested in the main effect of perspective (mindful
attention vs. immersion), predicting that mindful attention would elicit
more concrete responses compared to immersion. Consistent with this
prediction, we found a significant main effect of perspective, F(1,80)  =  
9.60, p  =  0.003, ηp   =  0.11. Collapsed across character groups (friend
and enemy), responses in the mindful attention group were more
concrete (M  =  1.79, SE  =  0.07) than were responses in the immersion
group (M  =  2.10, SE  =  0.07; M difference  =  0.31). This finding suggests
that, in general, participants in the mindful attention groups were more
likely to simply describe the specific details of their in-group and
out-group members’ actions, whereas immersion groups were more
likely to draw relatively abstract inferences about the character and
emotional states of both in-group and out-group members from their
actions.
The main effect of character was also significant, F(1,80)  =  5.97, p  =  
0.017, ηp   =  0.07. Collapsed across perspective and behavior valence,
the friend groups received more abstract responses (M  =  2.07, SE  =  
0.07) than did the enemy groups (M  =  1.82, SE  =  0.07). As the
three-way interaction in Fig. 2  illustrates, this main effect is most likely
driven by the immersion groups’ abstract responses to friends behaving
positively, together with their concrete responses to enemies behaving
negatively.
The omnibus interaction between behavior valence and character
(collapsed across perspective) was also significant, F(1,80)  =  36.94, p  <  
0.001, ηp   =  0.32. The mean difference in the linguistic abstraction
s
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scores between friend (2.26) and enemy (1.49) for a positive behavior
was 0.77, t(82)  =  7.00, SE  =  0.11, p  <  0.001, g   =  0.34. Conversely, the
mean difference in the scores between friend (1.88) and enemy (2.16)
for a negative behavior was −0.28, t(82)  =  1.87, SE  =  0.15, p  =  0.034, g   
=  0.53. As this pattern illustrates, there was a significant LIB across the
entire sample, driven primarily by the strong LIB in the two immersion
groups.
The main effect of behavior valence, the interaction between valence
and perspective, and the interaction between perspective and character
were not significant, F(1,80)  =  2.98, p  =  0.088, ηp   =  0.04; F(1,80)  =  
0.81, p  >  0.250, ηp   =  0.37; and F(1,80)  =  1.57, p  =  0.214, ηp   =  0.02,
respectively. These results do not limit or have any bearing on our main
overall hypotheses and so are not discussed further.
Some participants in our sample had previous experience with
meditation (25 out of 84). As a result of this experience, these
participants could have biased the data toward our hypothesized
outcomes. To address this issue, we conducted a supplemental analysis
excluding individuals who had previous meditation experience of any
kind (see Appendix C  in the SM for the complete details). As
illustrated in SM Figure 1 , the same pattern of results found for all 84
participants also emerged for the 59 participants without meditation
experience. Critically, there was still a significant three-way omnibus
interaction between behavior valence, perspective, and character type in
the non-meditators, F(1,55)  =  4.69, p  =  0.035, ηp   =  0.08. The
immersion groups still demonstrated the LIB for positive behaviors
(positive behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M difference  =  1.15, t(30)  =  6.39,
SE  =  0.18, p  <  0.001, g   =  2.20). They did not, however, exhibit a
significant LIB for negative behaviors (negative behaviors: friend vs.
enemy, M difference  =  −0.23, t(30)  =  −0.88, SE  =  0.26, p  =  0.187, g   =  
0.30), but classic research does not always observe the LIB for negative
behaviors (Maass 1999 ; Maass et al. 1989 ).
Non-meditators in the mindful attention groups also exhibited the LIB
for positive behaviors but not for negative behaviors (positive
behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M difference  =  0.47, t(25)  =  2.35, SE  =  
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0.20, p  =  0.011, g   =  0.88; negative behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M
difference  =  −0.01, t(25)  =  −0.04, SE  =  0.28, p  >  0.250, g   =  0.01). These
participants still rated the positive behavior of friends more abstractly
than the positive behavior of enemies. Compared to immersion groups,
however, the mindful attention groups exhibited a reduced LIB (positive
friend behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M difference  =  0.62, t(27)  =  3.26, SE  =  
0.19, p  =  0.001, g   =  1.18; negative enemy behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M
difference  =  0.54, t(28)  =  1.93, SE  =  0.27, p  =  0.026, g   =  0.69). Thus,
the mindful attention groups still rated expected behaviors (positive
friend, negative enemy) more concretely compared to the immersion
groups. In contrast, immersion groups were more likely to ascribe
abstract character judgments in these contexts. The SM includes all
other main effect and interaction results for the non-meditator subgroup.
In summary, non-meditators still exhibited the crucial pattern evident in
the complete sample: The immersion group exhibited the LIB, and the
mindful attention group exhibited a reduced LIB. Therefore, the
influence of individuals who already had experience with
mindfulness-based practices was not the driving force behind the
original results.
Although our sample only included 25 participants with varied
meditation experience, we ran an exploratory analysis to see if this
subgroup displayed a unique pattern of results (see Appendix C  in the
SM for the complete details). Again, the omnibus three-way interaction
between valence, perspective, and character was the key result to
examine for our hypotheses. As illustrated in SM Figure 2 , this
interaction was again significant, F(1,21)  =  6.70, p  =  0.017, ηp   =  0.24.
In the meditation subgroup, the immersion groups demonstrated the LIB
for both the expected positive friend behaviors and negative enemy
behaviors (positive behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M difference  =  1.19,
t(8)  =  3.72, SE  =  0.32, p  <  0.001, g   =  2.13; negative behaviors: friend
vs. enemy, M difference  =  −1.02, t(8)  =  2.76, SE  =  0.37, p  =  0.006, g   =  
1.58). Just like the pattern in our main results, immersion groups
replicated the LIB by describing expected behaviors (friend positive,
enemy negative) more abstractly than unexpected behaviors (friend
s
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negative, enemy positive).
Meditators in the mindful attention groups, however, exhibited no LIB.
These participants did not ascribe more abstract character judgments to
behaviors that matched biased expectations of friends behaving
positively and enemies negatively (positive behaviors: friend vs. enemy,
M difference  =  0.21, t(13)  =  0.81, SE  =  0.26, p  =  0.207, g   =  0.39;
negative behaviors: friend vs. enemy, M difference  =  −0.36, t(13)  =  
−1.20, SE  =  0.30, p  =  0.121, g   =  0.58). Because the sample sizes in
these comparisons were small, power was low, and the results should be
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the results suggest tentatively
that when meditators are instructed to use mindful attention, the LIB
may be relatively weak and perhaps not present.
Again, mindful attention groups had significantly more concrete
responses to expected behaviors (friend positive, enemy negative) when
compared to immersion groups (positive friend behaviors: IMM vs.
MA, M difference  =  0.66, t(11)  =  2.36, SE  =  0.28, p  =  0.013, g   =  1.22;
negative enemy behaviors: IMM vs. MA, M difference  =  0.69, t(10)  =  
1.97, SE  =  0.35, p  =  0.032, g   =  1.05). All other main effects and
interactions are reported in the SM. Based on these initial explorations,
it appears that the participants with meditation experience were even
more successful with mindful attention. When performing the observe
strategy, these participants exhibited no bias, whereas individuals in the
meditation naïve subgroup still exhibited an attenuated LIB. The
implications of these exploratory subgroup analyses are addressed
further in the “ Discussion ” section.
Discussion
The linguistic expectancy bias (LEB) is the use of abstract interpretive
language to describe expected behaviors (e.g., a friend’s positive
behavior, an enemy’s negative behavior), while using concrete language
to describe unexpected behaviors (e.g., a friend’s negative behavior, an
enemy’s positive behavior; Maass 1999 ). Using abstract interpretive
language implies that a behavior is a stable characteristic of an
individual, whereas concrete descriptive language implies that a
s
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behavior is unique and uncharacteristic. The linguistic intergroup bias
(LIB) is a specific example of the LEB, related to the valence of
expectancies about in-groups and out-groups. Whereas in-group
members are expected to behave positively, out-group members are
expected to behave negatively (e.g., Maass et al. 1989 ). Previous
research indicates that people are often unaware of their biased
linguistic tendencies and that the LEB and LIB can be used as implicit
measures of prejudice (Franco & Maass, 1996; von Hippel et al. 1997 ).
In the experiment reported here, we adapted a friend/enemy paradigm
(Douglas and Sutton 2003 ; Maass et al. 1995 ) and observed two basic
results: First, we replicated the LIB with immersion instructions.
Second, we observed a reduction in the LIB with mindful attention
instructions. We briefly review each result in turn.
When participants were asked to immerse themselves in cartoon stimuli
depicting a friend’s or enemy’s behavior, they described expected
behaviors (friend positive, enemy negative) more abstractly than
unexpected behaviors (friend negative, enemy positive). This bias may
have occurred with immersion instructions specifically because it
involved actively projecting oneself into an event. Participants were
encouraged to become absorbed in their thoughts and reactions to the
event and to vividly imagine actually being in the situation. In this way,
immersion instructions may have encouraged inferential linguistic
descriptions.
Importantly, our immersion condition replicates many previous LIB
experiments in which participants did not receive immersion
instructions but simply selected the best description for a scene with no
particular instructions given (e.g., Maass et al. 1995 ; Douglas and&
Sutton 2003 ). This finding suggests that immersion is the default
strategy participants apply when processing scenes (for supporting
evidence related to food stimuli, see Papies et al. 2012 , 2015 ).
Previous research reduced the LIB with explicit communication goals
(e.g., telling participants to view their out-group member in a more
positive light; Douglas and Sutton 2003 ; 2008 ). Our results
demonstrate that mindful attention—an aspect of mindfulness (Bishop
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et al. 2004 ; Lebois et al. 2015 ; Papies et al. 2015 )—is an implicit
modulator of linguistic abstraction, effectively reducing the LIB without
directly asking participants to be unbiased. Both mindful attention
groups had lower average linguistic abstraction scores overall compared
to the immersion groups. Additionally, both mindful attention groups
viewed expected behavior descriptions (friend positive, enemy
negative) more concretely than did the immersion groups. These results
suggest that observing one’s thoughts and reactions to events as fleeting
mental states reduces elaborations and inferences about actions,
encouraging a more concrete viewpoint on events, such that abstract
descriptions become less likely.
Although the mindful attention groups exhibited a significantly reduced
LIB compared to immersion groups, they still demonstrated a modest
linguistic intergroup bias for positive behaviors. Mindful attention
groups continued to describe positive behaviors for friends more
abstractly than those for enemies, suggesting that the LIB may be
difficult to overcome, even with a brief mindful attention intervention.
Later, we discuss how long-term meditation training may offer a more
powerful means of inducing still stronger changes in linguistic and
cognitive biases.
A variety of possible mechanisms associated with mindfulness could be
responsible for the modulation of the LIB that we observed, including,
decentering, self-disengagement, and subjective realism, each addressed
in turn. First, increasing evidence suggests that mindfulness produces a
shift in perspective often referred to as decentering (Bishop et al. 2004 ;
Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995).
Decentering produces the realization that thoughts, feelings, and
reactions to events are fleeting patterns of mental activity. Rather than
being experienced as true representations of one’s self and events in the
world, thoughts are simply experienced for what they are, thoughts.
Rather than being immersed in one’s thoughts, one sees them as
transitory mental states arising and dissipating in the moment.
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Second, the shift in perspective associated with mindfulness and
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decentering may result from disengaging a sense of self from one’s
thoughts. Following brief mindfulness interventions, two neuroimaging
experiments reported less self-referential, emotional, and visceral
integration for recalling negative autobiographical memories (Kross et
al., 2009) and for imagining stressful situations (Lebois et al. 2015 ).
Further evidence suggests that mindfulness reduces ego defensiveness
under threat (Brown et al. 2008 ; Niemiec et al. 2010 ) and diminishes
concern with oneself (Brown and& Ryan 2003 ). Additionally, Niemiec
et al. ( 2010 ) found that after participants’ in-group was threatened,
those low in mindfulness exhibited higher in-group partiality and more
out-group deprecation relative to those high in mindfulness. Across
these diverse paradigms, the decentering process associated with
mindfulness appears to decrease the association between one’s sense of
self and one’s thoughts.
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Third, the ability to disengage a sense of self from one’s thoughts via
decentering may reduce the subjective realism of thoughts. Subjective
realism is the experience that an imagined event or thought feels as if it
were happening in the present moment via mental time travel (Lebois et
al. 2015 ; Papies, et al. 2012 , 2015 ; also see “cognitive fusion,” Hayes
and Feldman 2004 ). The construct of subjective realism is readily
demonstrated in people’s responses to food cues. Much research shows
that viewing a picture of a delicious food typically activates an eating
simulation that reenacts tasting the food and experiencing the reward of
consuming it (e.g., Papies 2013 ; Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2005;
van der Laan et al. 2011 ). Once these eating simulations become active,
they motivate consumptive behavior, especially when hungry (Papies et
al. 2015 ). This process may work the same way in the context of
imagining an in-group or out-group member acting in positive or
negative ways. As these simulations become active, they produce
something like the experience of actually interacting with an
in-group/out-group member, which motivates subsequent reactions.
Most importantly, the shift in perspective associated with decentering
may disengage a sense of self from these simulations, such that they no
longer seem subjectively real, but are experienced instead as passing
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thoughts.
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Most likely the three mechanisms just described are not independent:
The shift in perspective associated with decentering appears to
disengage a sense of self from one’s thoughts, thereby decreasing their
subjective realism. All three mechanisms probably work together to
produce the benefits of mindfulness. From this perspective, we assume
that all three mechanisms may have operated in concert to decrease the
impact of bias and stereotypes observed here. Specifically, when a
stereotype became active as a thought during mindful attention, the
participant disengaged from the thought, decreasing its subjective
realism. In turn, the effects of differential expectancies and in-group
protection decreased, such that less linguistic abstraction occurred in a
biased way.
An important goal for future research is to assess the process model just
described, along with other possible accounts of how mindful attention
reduces the LIB. In doing so, it would be useful to establish evidence
for each individual mechanism and for their interaction. Another
important issue is to establish the extent to which people are born with
these mechanisms in place, as opposed to learning them through
instruction (Lebois et al. 2015 ).
Earlier, we reviewed literature illustrating that differential expectancies
and in-group protection promote linguistic abstraction. The mechanisms
just proposed to modulate the LIB may, more generally, modulate the
LEB. First, consider how mindful attention could operate to undermine
in-group protection. As described earlier, in-group protection is the
internal motivation to maintain a positive in-group and self-image by
abstractly describing desirable in-group behaviors and undesirable
out-group behaviors (Maass et al. 1989 ; Maass 1999 ). Much evidence
suggests that mindfulness induces feelings of acceptance and
compassion towards the self and others (Condon et al. 2013 ) and also
reduces reactivity to potential self-threats (e.g., Niemiec et al. 2010 ).
Therefore, when practicing mindful attention, our participants may have
not only felt more accepting towards themselves but may also have felt
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more accepting of out-group members. Participants may not have felt
the need to shield their self-image by attributing positive inferences to
their in-group and negative inferences to their out-group. As a result,
in-group protection decreased.
More generally, mindful attention may have also reduced differential
expectancies. As described earlier, differential expectancies constitute a
cognitive strategy that involves describing expected information
abstractly and unexpected information concretely (Maass et al. 1995 ;
Wigboldus et al. 2000 , 2005 ). Beyond the LIB, differential
expectancies can occur regardless of the valence of the behavior paired
with an in-group or out-group member. Say, for example, that you are
Caucasian. The stereotype exists that all Asians (your out-group) are
good at math. Even though Asians are your out-group, a linguistic
abstraction paradigm might show that you ascribe this positive math
ability to your out-group via an abstract description of this ability
(instead of a concrete behavior). If, however, you observe such thoughts
as passing mental states in the present moment (mindful attention), the
typical abstract, inferential, and evaluative thinking that produces
stereotypical expectations about people may not occur. Rather than
relying on previously stored beliefs about a person or an event, you may
simply observe the behavioral event occurring in the moment more
concretely for what it is.
Because we did not assess such non-valenced expected behaviors in our
experiment, we cannot conclude that mindful attention reduces
differential expectancies. Thus, another important goal for future
research is to examine whether mindful attention reduces differential
expectancies beyond the valenced behaviors associated with the LIB.
By examining a variety of other abstractions associated with stereotypes
(such as Asians being good at math), it should be possible to assess
whether mindful attention reduces the LEB more generally.
As reported earlier, we did not find significant differences between the
mindful attention and immersion groups for unexpected behaviors
(friend negative, enemy positive). Because these unexpected behaviors
were already described concretely in the immersion groups, a floor
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effect may have occurred in the mindful attention groups, such that
these behaviors could not be described more concretely. Although our
primary focus was to reduce linguistic abstraction bias by eliciting
concrete descriptions of expected behaviors, one might nevertheless
imagine it would be desirable to describe the positive behaviors of
out-group members abstractly, at least under some circumstances. In
other words, attributing positive abstract characteristics to the positive
behaviors of out-group members offers an additional means of reducing
the LIB, besides reducing negative abstract character attributions to
negative behaviors.
Limitations and Future Directions
In our paradigm, participants were instructed to implement a specific
perspective (mindful attention or immersion) while viewing the critical
cartoon materials. A more robust test of mindful attention’s effect on
the LIB would be to teach participants the perspective initially and then
see if it carries over to their later viewing of the materials without
explicitly being told to adopt it. In our experiment here, however,
instructing participants to continue with the perspective while viewing
the critical materials may actually mirror how novice meditators first
begin to attend mindfully. Initially, this perspective may be an effortful
choice that gradually becomes more unconscious with practice.
Although our paradigm used an implicit task and intervention in the
sense that we (1) did not directly ask participants about their
in-group/out-group biases, (2) did not directly tell them that we were
measuring their biases, and (3) did not directly ask them to change their
biases (Fazio and& Olson 2003 ), it is unclear whether the reduction in
LIB occurred outside conscious awareness. During the exit interview,
we did not ask participants whether they noticed differences in
linguistic abstraction between the four LCM descriptions that were
provided nor did we ask mindful attention participants if they were
aware of the potential effect that the “observing” perspective might
have had on their choices. Thus, we cannot say for certain that the
observed reduction in the LIB here occurred completely outside
participants’ conscious awareness (analogous to the same issue that
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confronts many other implicit tasks, such as the Implicit Association
Test). Future experiments could begin to test conscious awareness by
introducing these questions during an exit interview and by using other
methods that establish unconscious processing.
Previous LIB research has not included immersion instructions. Instead,
LIB experiments have simply instructed participants to imagine their
friend or enemy performing the behaviors depicted in the cartoon events
without explicitly telling them how to do so (e.g., Maass et al. 1995 ;
Douglas and& Sutton 2003 ). One might worry that explicit immersion
instructions were responsible for our results. Rather than mindful
attention reducing bias, immersion may have increased it.
Several reasons, however, suggest that this was not the case. First,
previous research has demonstrated that immersion instructions and
regular viewing instructions (e.g., “simply look at the pictures”)
produce similar results, suggesting that immersion constitutes
participants’ default perspective toward their thoughts (Papies et al.
2012 , 2015 ). Second, the responses in our immersion groups were
strikingly similar to those reported in the LIB literature when
immersion instructions were not used (see Maass 1999  for a review).
To the extent that responses in our immersion group deviated from
those the literature, they were often more concrete (e.g., friend/positive:
2.57 for us vs. 2.69 for Maass et al. 1989 ; enemy/negative: 2.43 vs.
2.82 for Maass et al. 1989 ; friend/negative: 2 vs. 2.51 for Maass et al
1989 ; enemy/positive: 1.40 vs. 2.47 for Maass et al. 1989 ). Both
findings suggest that immersion instructions were not responsible for
the differences in the LIB that we observed between the immersion and
mindful attention groups. Future experiments, however, could include
both immersion and regular viewing groups to assess this issue directly.
Our participant sample was comprised of individuals who were both
meditation-naïve and meditation-experienced. Another possible concern
is that participants with meditation experience constituted the driving
force behind our observed reduction in the LIB, not the mindful
attention instructions. To ensure a more uniformly meditation-naïve
sample, we could have recruited only meditation-naïve participants
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from the outset. Problematically, however, participants could have
anticipated the relevance of meditation-related principles with this
exclusion procedure, which could have biased their responses. Instead,
to address this concern, we completed a follow-up analysis including
only meditation-naïve participants. In this analysis, these participants
still exhibited the critical pattern observed in the complete sample. The
immersion groups still displayed the LIB, and the mindful attention
groups still exhibited a reduced LIB.
A natural avenue for future research, however, would be to examine
similar effects with experienced meditators. Previous research has
demonstrated that for individuals to respond without prejudice to
out-group members, they must overcome years of exposure to
stereotypical information (Devine 1989 ), using effortful, regulatory
strategies (Devine and& Monteith 1993 , 1999 ; Devine et al. 2002 ).
Our modulation of the LIB with a very brief mindful attention
intervention suggests that another way of reducing bias and prejudice is
to cultivate mindfulness. Although we only had 25 participants of
varied meditation experience in our sample, we found that these
individuals did not exhibit the LIB in the mindful attention groups. This
finding needs to be replicated in a larger sample of experienced
meditators, but it does suggest that more consistent, extended practice
with mindfulness meditation may have strong effects on linguistic
biases associated with prejudice.
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